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FEDERALISM OF THE HIGHEST CALIBER: COUNTERACTIVE 
LEGISLATION AND THE IDAHO FIREARMS FREEDOM ACT 
AUDREY G. THORNE* 
ABSTRACT 
Counteractive legislation is a phenomenon that has been prevalent 
throughout almost the entirety of U.S. history. The Idaho Firearms 
Freedom Act, passed in 2010, provides a unique opportunity to survey 
one piece of counteractive legislation from start to finish. The 
continued presence of this law in Idaho has the potential to result in 
detrimental reliance by citizens who believe they are lawfully 
exercising their right to bear arms, despite being in violation of federal 
law. This comment provides a close look at the Idaho Firearms 
Freedom Act and examines the history of counteractive legislation in 
Idaho and at the national level, as well as its potential side effects.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 8, 2010, Second Amendment enthusiasts in Idaho declared victory 
when Governor Butch Otter signed the Idaho Firearms Freedom Act (IFFA) into law.1 
From its inception, it was clear that the IFFA was problematic, as it was not only in 
direct conflict with multiple federal laws, but also explicitly deemed said laws 
ineffective—a seemingly unconstitutional and fruitless exercise of states’ rights 
 
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of Idaho College of Law, 2020. I express my most sincere 
gratitude to Professor Aliza Cover for her insight and guidance on this comment and throughout my law 
school career. I would also like to thank my colleagues on the Idaho Law Review for their diligent editing 
and encouragement. Finally, special thanks to my mother, Amy Thorne, who is my greatest inspiration 
in everything I do. All errors are my own. 
1. Idaho Code § 18-3315A (2019); Michael Boldin, Idaho Legislature Passes the Firearms Freedom 
Act, Tenth Amend. Ctr. (Apr. 3, 2010), https://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2010/04/idaho-
legislature-passes-the-firearms-freedom-act/. 





under the Supremacy Clause.2 Despite the apparent clarity that the law would be 
null and void, the Idaho Legislature passed the IFFA.3 The IFFA’s unconstitutionality 
was settled after an almost identical Montana law was challenged in federal court 
and found to be unconstitutional.4  As of February 2019 the IFFA remains codified 
law in Idaho, creating the potential for detrimental reliance by Idaho citizens who 
believe their conduct is legal when in all actuality, they are in violation of federal 
law.  
The IFFA is not a legislative anomaly in the state of Idaho. Idaho Legislators 
have passed and continue to propose a host of legislation that claims to invalidate 
federal law, expresses dissent against federal law and policy, or directly contradicts 
governing federal law.5  
This predicament is not unique to Idaho. Throughout the history of the United 
States, state legislatures have enacted legislation that attempts to nullify or 
counteract federal law, a phenomenon I have deemed “counteractive legislation.” 
Counteractive legislation was first introduced in 1798.6 The first piece of 
identifiable counteractive legislation codified a state’s attempt at nullification and 
was almost immediately condemned by the federal government.7 Despite the initial 
lack of success, states have continued to pass counteractive legislation.8 There are 
a variety of goals states hope to achieve by passing counteractive legislation, as well 
as an array of negative consequences that can spawn from it.  
This comment addresses the concept of counteractive legislation. Part I 
provides further explanation of counteractive legislation, as well as the benefits and 
drawbacks of passing it. Part II examines Idaho’s passage of the IFFA, the potential 
negative repercussions it may have, and other counteractive legislation passed by 
the Idaho Legislature. Part III provides a summary of counteractive legislation at the 
national level. Part IV provides a brief approach to counteractive legislation moving 
forward, both locally in Idaho and at the national level.  
 
 
II. COUNTERACTIVE LEGISLATION  
 
2. House State Affairs Committee: Hearing on H.B. 589, 2010 Leg., (Idaho 2010) (statement of 
Rep. Harwood), https://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2010/standingcommittees/HSTA/. 
3. Boldin, supra note 1.  
4. Mont. Shooting Sports Ass'n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2013). 
5. See generally Idaho Code § 39-9003 (2019); Idaho Code § 18-3315B (2019); H.R. Res. 461, 2018 
Leg. (Idaho 2018); Mike Price, Idaho Legislators Seek to Make Abortion Murder, EAST IDAHO NEWS.COM 
(Jan. 30, 2019, 6:00 PM), https://www.eastidahonews.com/2019/01/idaho-legislators-seek-to-make-
abortion-murder/. 
6. James Madison & Thomas Jefferson, The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, BILL RTS. INSTITUTE, 
https://billofrightsinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/VirginiaKentuckyResolutions.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2019).  
7. Andrew Jackson, Proclamation Respecting the Nullifying Law of South Carolina, Proclamation 
No. 43, 11 Stat. 771 (Dec. 10, 1832), https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=011/llsl011.db&recNum=816. 
8. See infra notes 145, 172, and 178 
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Counteractive legislation, as I have defined it, refers to state legislation that 
seeks to nullify or counteract federal law, or results in an outcome that is 
incompatible with federal law. Within counteractive legislation, one could identify 
a variety of subcategories.9 However, for purposes of this article, I have chosen to 
examine the topic of counteractive legislation from a broad perspective.  
A. The Goals of Counteractive Legislation 
A primary motivation for passing counteractive legislation may be an attempt 
to formalize social norms, especially when a disconnect exists between such norms 
and existing federal law. Proponents of counteractive legislation hope that 
Congress will recognize social norms as they become codified in state legislation 
and respond accordingly—that is, by enacting or amending federal law to reflect 
these norms. Others believe that counteractive legislation can provide an 
opportunity for the United States Supreme Court to overturn existing precedent.  
For example, a large number of states have legalized marijuana usage, a policy 
decision that contradicts with the federal government’s continued criminalization 
of marijuana possession and use.10 As more and more states permit medical and 
recreational marijuana use, which in turn may allow for more research on the drug 
and its side effects, Congress may feel increased pressure to reevaluate marijuana’s 
drug scheduling or overall legality. 
The hope that counteractive legislation will prompt action by Congress or the 
Supreme Court is less persuasive in other contexts. Multiple states have enacted 
counteractive legislation targeting different issues including firearms and 
abortion.11 It is unlikely that these pieces of legislation will sway the actions of 
Congress or the Supreme Court, considering that both branches of government 
have had multiple opportunities to revisit these issues but seem hesitant to do so.  
Additionally, counteractive legislation is arguably a means of exerting political 
pressure on members of Congress who support the targeted federal legislation or 
regulation. Notwithstanding the possibility that counteractive legislation can serve 
as a codified record of distaste for a particular politician’s actions, it is difficult to 
 
9. For illustrative purposes, I have identified three subcategories I feel are most comprehensive: 
nullification legislation, expressive legislation, and contradictory legislation. Nullification legislation 
refers to state legislation that either expressly or impliedly purports to nullify federal law. Expressive 
legislation is state legislation that is ordinarily passed to convey a state’s viewpoint on a decision made 
at the federal level, be it newly enacted legislation, a Supreme Court opinion, or a policy decision made 
by a presidential administration. Contradictory legislation is state legislation that is either contradictory 
or inconsistent with federal law or Supreme Court precedent. One piece of counteractive legislation may 
encompass multiple subcategories, depending on its desired purpose. 
10. Jeremy Berke & Skye Gould, Legal Marijuana Just Went on Sale in Illinois, BUS. INSIDER (Jun. 
25, 2019, 1:52 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/legal-marijuana-states-2018-1. 
11. Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming have 
all passed laws attempting to circumvent federal firearm legislation. See State By State, FIREARMS FREEDOM 
ACT , http://firearmsfreedomact.com/state-by-state/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2019); see also infra note 21.  





know when or if counteractive legislation has a direct impact on members of 
Congress and their decision-making. This reasoning is also less persuasive in states 
like Idaho, whose members of Congress are customarily aligned with the state 
legislature and are therefore more likely to vote in line with the majority of the 
Idaho legislative body.12  
Some who support the concept of counteractive legislation also argue that it 
functions as an effective method of increasing public understanding about the 
federal law or policy at issue.13 The hope is that counteractive legislation will draw 
attention to the federal action that the state is responding to.14 
While this may be true in certain scenarios, when counteractive legislation like 
the IFFA is not enacted in clear and direct response to widely known federal law or 
policy, this function seems unlikely to be served. Furthermore, the cost and 
confusion caused by counteractive legislation seems a high price to pay for the 
chance of increasing public discourse on any given topic. 
Counteractive legislation may be enacted with the hope that a lawsuit will 
ensue between the state and federal government, providing a forum for the courts 
to revisit an issue the state feels was wrongly decided. The problem with this, as 
demonstrated by the Montana Firearms Freedom Act (MFFA), is that even if a 
lawsuit ensues, there is never a guarantee that the desired outcome will occur.15 
Furthermore, lawsuits in which a state itself is a party can cost taxpayers hundreds 
of thousands of dollars, if not more.16 
B. Consequences of Counteractive Legislation  
Counteractive legislation can potentially create a variety of problems, ranging 
from general confusion about the law to criminal prosecution of citizens who are 
misled by counteractive legislation.  
The confusion that can amount from the codification of counteractive 
legislation should arguably persuade lawmakers that the legislation is not worth its 
perceived benefits. However, additional negative consequences should dissuade 
legislators in Idaho and throughout the country from using legislation as a mere 
form of political expression.  
 
12. United States Congressional Delegations from Idaho, Ballotpedia, 
https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_congressional_delegations_from_Idaho#2000s (last visited Feb. 
3, 2019). Idaho has had only one Democratic congressman in the last 20 years. Adam Cotterell, How 
Idaho Became a One Party State, BOISE ST. PUB. RADIO (May 13, 2014), 
https://www.boisestatepublicradio.org/post/how-idaho-became-one-party-state#stream/0. Similarly, 
for the past 20 years, and throughout its history, the Idaho Legislature has been overwhelmingly 
Republican. Id. 
13. Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to Federal 
Health Reform, 39 Hofstra L. Rev. 111, 163 (2010).  
14. Id.  
15. Mont. Shooting Sports Ass'n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2013). 
16. See James Dawson, Is Idaho's Constitutional Defense Fund a Backstop for Shaky Legislation?, 
BOISE ST. PUB. RADIO (Sep. 12, 2019) https://www.boisestatepublicradio.org/post/idahos-constitutional-
defense-fund-backstop-shaky-legislation#stream/0. 
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Nearly all forms of counteractive legislation open the door for detrimental 
reliance. Of particular import is counteractive legislation that purports to allow 
activity that is prohibited under federal law. This type of legislation is likely to 
confuse citizens about their obligations under state and federal law and does not 
provide those who rely on it with a mistake of law defense in the event that they 
are criminally prosecuted.  
Citizens are presumed to know the law.17 An actor’s lack of awareness that 
their conduct is illegal is not a defense to criminal prosecution.18 A mistake of law 
defense, often deemed entrapment by estoppel, is available only when an actor can 
prove they reasonably relied on a misstatement of the law that came from a 
government agent who was responsible for interpreting the law.19 Any individual 
who relies on state law when engaging in conduct that is illegal under federal law 
cannot assert a mistake of law defense, because state officials who enact 
counteractive legislation are not responsible for interpreting federal law.20  
Counteractive legislation can also put a stop to legal conduct that individuals 
might otherwise engage in. Consider abortion—a policy area frequently targeted 
by counteractive legislation. Multiple states have passed laws regulating abortion 
that are preempted by federal law.21 These state laws often purport to create 
restrictions around abortion that are clearly impermissible under long-standing 
federal precedent.22 Some go as far as criminalizing abortion altogether.23  
Although the restrictions these abortion laws claim to mandate are often 
inoperative, they can still have a dramatic chilling effect on women and health care 
providers alike. Those who support this type of legislation would likely see the 
potential for such a chilling effect as a positive; however, these laws could have 
other dramatic repercussions.24  
 
17. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991). 
18. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring); Cheek, 498 U.S at 
199. 
19. United States v. Hardridge, 379 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2004). 
20. United States v. Cox, 906 F.3d 1170, 1194 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2690 
(2019), and cert. denied sub nom., Kettler v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2691 (2019). (“A state legislature’s 
statement about the reach of federal law is hardly an ‘official’ statement of federal law, and to rely on 
such a statement is not reasonable.”). 
21. Abortion Policy in the Absence of Roe, Guttmacher Institute 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/abortion-policy-absence-roe (last visited Feb. 3, 
2019).  
22. Id.  
23. Id.; see also infra note 133.  
24. See Rachel Benson Gold, Lessons From Before Roe: Will Past Be Prologue?, GUTTMACHER 
INSTITUTE (March 1, 2003), https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr/2003/03/lessons-roe-will-past-be-
prologue; Sarah Kramer, The GOP’s New Abortion Plans Could Lead to Some Chilling Consequences, Bus. 
Insider (July 26, 2016, 9:26 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/anti-abortion-womens-health-
effects-2016-7. It is well known that prior to the legalization of abortion, the procedure was still 
performed, often under high-risk circumstances. Id. In 1965, the number of deaths due to illegal abortion 
 





Recognizing negative consequences that may result when a specific piece of 
counteractive legislation is passed or proposed is an easier task than recognizing 
the problems of counteractive legislation as a whole. Generally speaking, perhaps 
the most predominant problem posed by counteractive legislation is the potential 
it creates for a misunderstanding of the relationship between state and federal law 
that may be difficult to undue.  
The average citizen may not have a dynamic understanding of the Supremacy 
Clause, or the effect it has on state laws that purport to nullify or circumvent federal 
law.25 Citizens might follow a piece of counteractive legislation as it becomes 
codified law and assume that the law and others like it are valid. Unless the law is 
repealed or something of consequence occurs that draws attention to the law’s 
ineffectiveness—such as a high-level prosecution involving the law at issue—
citizens may never become aware that their state legislature lacks the power to 
challenge federal law in this manner.  
Furthermore, if citizens do become aware of a law’s ineffectiveness following 
its codification, it could lead to distrust in the state legislature and its members. It 
is reasonable for citizens to assume that legislators would not pass a law that is in 
effect meaningless, never mind a law which, if relied upon, could put citizens at risk 
of federal criminal prosecution.  
III. IDAHO’S HISTORY WITH COUNTERACTIVE LEGISLATION 
Idaho has passed multiple laws that conflict with federal law.26 The Idaho 
Firearms Freedom Act (IFFA) provides a useful case study of how and why 
counteractive legislation has been and continues to be passed in Idaho. Because 
the IFFA can mislead Idaho citizens into believing they can legally engage in various 
conduct prohibited by federal law, the consequences of it remaining codified law 
are somewhat unique. Although a legal scholar may recognize that the IFFA cannot 
do what it claims—that is, totally exempt certain firearms from federal 
prosecution—the average citizen may not. So long as the IFFA remains codified law 
in Idaho, the majority of citizens may have no knowledge of its practical 
ineffectiveness and could detrimentally rely on it due to a mistaken belief that it 
effectively exempts them from federal law. Despite these potential repercussions, 
Idaho legislators have not only allowed the IFFA to remain current law but have also 
continued to propose and pass additional pieces of counteractive legislation.27 
C. Idaho Firearms Freedom Act 
 
accounted for seventeen percent of all deaths related to pregnancy and childbirth. Id. Women and 
practitioners who fear prosecution may revert to obtaining and performing the procedure under similar 
risky circumstances. Id. 
25. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
26. See infra Section II.B. 
27. See infra Section II.B. 
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The right to bear arms has long been considered a liberty interest of the 
utmost importance to Idahoans.28 The Idaho Constitution reiterates the right to 
keep and bear arms, as promised in the United States Constitution.29 The Idaho 
Constitution goes further in its support of the right to bear arms by prohibiting laws 
imposing “licensure, registration or special taxation on the ownership or possession 
of firearms or ammunition.”30 It also prohibits laws that would allow for the 
confiscation of firearms other than those used in the commission of a felony.31 
In 2010, Idaho took an additional step in attempting to protect the right to 
bear arms by passing the Idaho Firearms Freedom Act (IFFA).32 While the IFFA’s 
primary purpose seems to be to nullify federal gun regulations, it is also a 
declaration from Idaho Legislators of their “intention of Idaho becoming the freest 
state in the Union.”33 The IFFA states, in no uncertain terms, that any firearm, 
firearm accessory, or ammunition that is manufactured commercially or privately 
in Idaho is not subject to federal regulation.34 “It is declared by the legislature that 
those items have not traveled in interstate commerce,” meaning, in theory, that 
they cannot be subject to federal regulation.35 The IFFA goes further in attempting 
to exempt these firearms from federal regulation by saying that certain 
“insignificant parts” that may be used to manufacture firearms do not subject the 
firearm to federal regulation, even if those parts have traveled through interstate 
commerce.36 This language directly conflicts with the long-standing ability of the 
federal government to regulate firearms within the United States.37 
Congress has the power, under the Commerce Clause, to regulate a 
commodity so long as there is a rational basis for concluding that regulated activity, 
when taken in the aggregate, will have a substantial effect on interstate 
 
28. Idaho Const. art. I, § 11. 
29. Id. 
30. Id.  
31. Id.  
32. Boldin, supra note 1.  
33. Idaho Firearms Freedom Act, ch. 244, § 2(7), 2010 Idaho Sess. Laws 627, 628 (2010). “In 
enacting this law, the Idaho legislators are declaring their intention of Idaho becoming the freest state 
in the Union.” Id. The law is titled “Prohibition of federal regulation of certain firearms.” Id. § 3. 
34. Idaho Code § 18-3315A (2016). 
35. Id. 
36. Id.  
37. See National Firearms Act, ATF, https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/national-
firearms-act (last visited Feb. 3, 2020). In 1934, Congress enacted the National Firearms Act (NFA) as part 
of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. Congress amended NFA with the Federal Firearms Act of 1938 (FFA) 
which required a federal license requirement for individuals in the business of selling firearms. See Key 
Federal Acts Regulating Firearms, Giffords L. Ctr., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/federal-
law/other-laws/key-federal-acts-regulating-firearms/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2020). The Gun Control Act of 
1968 (GCA) revised the NFA and FFA, regulating interstate and foreign commerce in firearms. See Gun 
Control Act, ATF, https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/gun-control-act (last visited Feb. 3, 2020). 
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, passed in 1993, amended the GCA, imposing a background 
check requirement on individuals purchasing a handgun. See Brady Law, ATF, 
https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/brady-law (last visited Feb. 3, 2020).  





commerce.38 Federal courts have held that Congress has a rational basis for 
concluding that firearms, firearm accessories, and ammunition, even when 
manufactured purely intrastate, will have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.39 
The federal government has used its commerce power to pass numerous 
regulations on firearms, most notably the Gun Control Act, passed in 1968; the 
Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, passed in 1986; and the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act, passed in 1993.40 This history of federal regulation of firearms, 
coupled with Commerce Clause jurisprudence, makes clear that Congress has the 
power to regulate certain commodities, including firearms, regardless of their 
actual entry into interstate commerce.41  
It seems highly unlikely that Idaho legislators were unaware of Congress’s 
power in this arena when they passed the IFFA. At minimum, Idaho legislators 
should have been skeptical of the IFFA’s effectiveness following its passage, not 
only because of Congress’s well-known commerce power, but also because of 
Idaho’s active involvement in litigation involving an almost identical Montana law, 
the Montana Firearms Freedom Act (MFFA).  
The MFFA42 was the first piece of legislation of its kind, and many states, 
including Idaho, went on to model similar pieces of legislation off of the MFFA.43 It 
was passed primarily as “a Tenth Amendment challenge to the powers of Congress 
under the ‘commerce clause,’ with firearms as the object.”44 The language of the 
IFFA mirrors the MFFA almost exactly.45  
Following the passage of the MFFA, the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives distributed a letter stating that the MFFA conflicted with 
federal firearms laws and was necessarily superseded by federal law.46 Despite this 
 
38. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).  
39. See United States v. Stewart, 451 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds 
by District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 594–95 (2008) (The Ninth Circuit held that Congress had 
a rational basis for concluding that the possession of homemade machine guns could substantially affect 
the interest market in machine guns.). 
40. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968); Firearms Owners’ Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986); Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993).   
41. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); United States v. Stewart, 451 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th 
Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds by District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 594–95 (2008); see 
also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (wherein the Supreme Court stated that “the commerce 
power is not confined in its exercise to the regulation of commerce among the states”). 
42. Mont. Code Ann. § 30-20-104 (2019). 
43. The Firearms Freedom Act (FFA) Is Sweeping the Nation., FIREARMS FREEDOM ACT (Jun. 3, 2010), 
http://firearmsfreedomact.com/. 
44. Id. 
45. Compare Idaho Code § 18-3315A (2019), with Mont. Code Ann. § 30-20-104 (2019).  
46. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, Open Letter to all 
Montana Federal Firearms Licensees (July 16, 2009), https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/open-
letter/montana-july2009-open-letter-guidance-regarding-montana-firearms-freedom/download. 
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letter, the Montana law remained in statute and many states, including Idaho, 
enacted similar legislation.47 
In 2013, the Ninth Circuit found the MFFA to be unconstitutional.48 A Montana 
citizen named Gary Marbut, joined by the Montana Shooting Sports Association and 
the Second Amendment Foundation, filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that 
Congress lacked the power to regulate the activities contemplated by the MFFA and 
injunctive relief preventing the federal government from bringing civil or criminal 
actions under federal firearms law against Montana citizens acting in compliance 
with the MFFA.49 Marbut owned a firearm equipment manufacturing business and 
sought to manufacture and sell firearms and ammunition under the MFFA without 
complying with applicable federal firearms regulations.50 Marbut stated that he had 
several interested buyers, but that these potential customers did not want and 
would not buy his firearms if they were manufactured by a federal firearms 
licensee.51 His suit made its way to the Ninth Circuit, after a federal district court 
dismissed the case, finding that Marbut lacked standing.52  
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that Marbut did in fact have standing, as 
he faced potential economic injury by being unable to manufacture his firearms and 
ammunition as desired.53 Marbut argued that the manufacture and sale of his 
firearms was outside the scope of the Commerce Clause and, therefore, federal 
licensing laws did not apply.54 He advocated for an extremely narrow interpretation 
of the Commerce Clause, arguing that the current understanding of Congress’s 
commerce power was inconsistent with dual sovereignty.55 In his opening brief, 
Marbut recognized that existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence was against him, 
and that, to an extent, the court’s hands were tied.56 Based on his recognition of 
the district and circuit courts’ limited ability to provide a remedy, it seems plausible 
that Marbut was hoping to take his case to the Supreme Court, where he could 
directly challenge the Court’s existing Commerce Clause precedent.  
Marbut was correct in his prediction that the court would be able to provide 
little remedy. The Ninth Circuit quickly found that Congress’s commerce power 
extended to Marbut’s manufacture and sale of his firearms, regardless of any state 
 
47. See The Firearms Freedom Act (FFA) Is Sweeping the Nation., supra note 443; Associated Press, 
Gun-Rights Activists Ask Supreme Court to Uphold ‘Firearms Freedom Act’, FOX NEWS (Nov. 26, 2013), 
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/gun-rights-activists-ask-supreme-court-to-uphold-firearms-
freedom-act.  
48. Mont. Shooting Sports Ass'n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2013). 
49. Id. at 978–79.  
50. Id. at 978. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 979. 
53. Id. 
54. Mont. Shooting Sports Ass'n, 727 F.3d at 981. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 





law to the contrary.57 The court found that Congress’s regulation of firearms, even 
in the intrastate context, was a constitutional exercise of its commerce power.58 
“Congress could have rationally concluded that the manufacture of unlicensed 
firearms, even if initially sold only within the State of Montana, would in the 
aggregate substantially affect the interstate market for firearms.”59 The court also 
found that, because the MFFA claimed that such conduct was outside the reach of 
federal law, the MFFA itself was invalid.60 Marbut appealed the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision, but the Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari, turning down an 
opportunity to reexamine Congress’s firearm regulations and power under the 
Commerce Clause.61  
Idaho filed an amicus brief in support of Marbut’s challenge to the federal 
government.62 Based on Idaho’s public support of the suit while pending, it is highly 
unlikely that the Idaho legislature was unaware of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the 
MFFA is unconstitutional. In fact, the majority of the legislators who supported 
passing the IFFA appear to have been aware of its unconstitutionality and 
ineffectiveness, as well as the potential for resultant litigation against the federal 
government.  
When the IFFA was first introduced in the Idaho House of Representatives in 
March 2010, its primary sponsor, Representative Dick Harwood, was aware of the 
then-pending lawsuit involving the nearly identical MFFA.63 When testifying in 
support of the IFFA at its initial introduction, Representative Harwood 
acknowledged that the MFFA had made its way to the court in Montana and that 
with it came the possibility of a fight at the Supreme Court.64  
The IFFA, from its inception, appears to have been a calculated way for Idaho 
and other states to fight for states’ rights to regulate firearms and other 
commodities. During the initial hearing on the IFFA, Representative Harwood 
acknowledged that the IFFA and other firearms laws like it were tools that would 
ideally be used to narrow the federal government’s commerce power.65 When 
Representative Harwood later presented the bill to the Senate State Affairs 
Committee, he further acknowledged that it was a challenge to the federal 
 
57. Id. at 981–82. 
58. See id. 
59. Id. at 982. 
60. Mont. Shooting Sports Ass'n, 727 F.3d at 982–83. 
61. Mont. Shooting Sports Ass'n v. Holder, 571 U.S. 1131 (2014);  
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 571 U.S. 1131 (2014) (No. 
13-634), http://www.firearmsfreedomact.com/MSSA%20cert%20petition%20112113.pdf.  
62. Brief of the States of Utah, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants and Reversal, Mont. 
Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975 (2013) (No. 10-36094), 2011 WL 2452499.  
63. House State Affairs Committee: Hearing on H.B. 589, 2010 Leg. (Idaho 2010) (statement of 
Rep. Harwood), https://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2010/standingcommittees/HSTA/. 
64. Id. Representative Harwood further recognized the potential for litigation around the IFFA 
when he noted the existence of various legal organizations who would be willing to represent Idaho in 
the matter, seemingly suggesting that he had already contacted or been contacted by law firms about 
the IFFA. 
65. Id. 
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government’s commerce power.66 Additionally, he seemed to argue that the 
federal government, through its federal gun regulations, was limiting, or at least 
had the potential to limit, the supply of parts necessary to manufacture firearms, 
and that the IFFA would solidify Idaho’s ability to manage the supply of these parts 
on its own.67  
Representative Phil Hart, another supporter of the IFFA, opined that it was 
part of a larger scheme of states trying to challenge Congress’s broad Commerce 
Clause power.68 Despite his acknowledgment that the IFFA was part of a nationwide 
attempt to challenge Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, 
Representative Hart also insisted that it was not the supporters’ intent to set up a 
legal case.69 However, when pressed about the true purpose of the IFFA, 
Representative Hart admitted that it was the goal of the IFFA’s drafters and 
supporters to bring a case to the Supreme Court focusing “on the issues of the 
federalism of the Second Amendment,” as well as the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments.70  
Another state senator, Monty Pearce, professed that the IFFA was one of 
several pieces of legislation intended to push back against the federal 
government.71 “This simply challenges the power of the federal government to 
regulate everything in the state of Idaho under the guise of interstate commerce.”72 
Pearce also said the IFFA would be friendly to businesses that want to manufacture 
firearms in Idaho free of federal regulation, although he knew of only one such 
business.73 An additional supporter of the IFFA, Representative Marv Hagedorn, 
said he wanted to “put the federal government’s back to the wall and ask them to 
explain why they need to get into commerce between myself and a family 
member.”74 
 
66. Senate State Affairs Committee: Hearing on H.B. 589, 2010 Leg. (Idaho 2010) (statement of 
Rep. Harwood), https://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2010/standingcommittees/SSTA/. 
67. Id. Representative Harwood appears to have argued that the disallowance of the federal 
government from regulating firearms and the parts used to manufacture them was necessary in order 
to prevent the government from restricting or prohibiting access to firearms and their necessary parts. 
Harwood argued that if the government were to impose such restrictions, it would effectively eliminate 
citizens’ right to own a firearm. 
68. Id. (statement of Rep. Hart), 
https://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2010/standingcommittees/SSTA/. 
69. Id.  
70. Id. Representative Hart did not expound on exactly how he and the IFFA’s drafters and 
supporters hoped to use the IFFA to challenge to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.  




74. Michael Boldin, Idaho Legislature Passes the Firearms Freedom Act, TENTH AMEND. CTR. (Apr. 
3, 2010), https://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2010/04/idaho-legislature-passes-the-firearms-
freedom-act/.  





Elliot Werk, one of only seven senators opposed to the IFFA, publicly took 
issue with the goal of initiating a lawsuit with the federal government.75 Senator 
Werk was also concerned by the lack of background checks required under IFFA for 
Idaho-made guns.76 Without background checks, citizens prohibited from 
purchasing firearms could theoretically purchase an Idaho-made firearm with no 
questions asked.77  
Despite the IFFA’s practical ineffectiveness and the valid concerns of Senator 
Werk and others, the Idaho legislature passed the IFFA in 2010.78 Idaho has allowed 
the IFFA to remain in statute, with language almost identical to that of the MFFA.79 
It is therefore almost a foregone conclusion that the IFFA, like the MFFA, would be 
found unconstitutional were it be challenged in court.  
D. Consequences of the IFFA 
Supporters of the IFFA were well aware of its potential negative effect on state 
citizens. Many who ultimately supported its passage voiced concerns about the 
possibility that Idaho citizens could end up defending themselves in federal court 
 
75. Senate Approves Made-in-Idaho Gun Law, supra note 71.  
76. Id.  
77. Id. 
78. Idaho Code § 18-3315A (2010).  
79. Compare Idaho Code § 18-3315A (2019) (“It is declared by the legislature that generic and 
insignificant parts that have other manufacturing or consumer product applications are not firearms, 
firearms accessories or ammunition, and their importation into Idaho and incorporation into a firearm, 
a firearm accessory or ammunition manufactured in Idaho does not subject the firearm, firearm 
accessory or ammunition to federal regulation. It is declared by the legislature that basic materials, such 
as unmachined steel and unshaped wood, are not firearms, firearms accessories or ammunition and are 
not subject to congressional authority to regulate firearms, firearms accessories and ammunition under 
interstate commerce as if they were actually firearms, firearms accessories or ammunition. The authority 
of congress to regulate interstate commerce in basic materials does not include authority to regulate 
firearms, firearms accessories and ammunition made in Idaho from those materials. Firearms 
accessories that are imported into Idaho from another state and that are subject to federal regulation 
as being in interstate commerce do not subject a firearm to federal regulation under interstate 
commerce because they are attached to or used in conjunction with a firearm in Idaho.”), with Mont. 
Code Ann. § 30-20-104 (2019) (“A personal firearm, a firearm accessory, or ammunition that is 
manufactured commercially or privately in Montana and that remains within the borders of Montana is 
not subject to federal law or federal regulation, including registration, under the authority of congress 
to regulate interstate commerce. It is declared by the legislature that those items have not traveled in 
interstate commerce. This section applies to a firearm, a firearm accessory, or ammunition that is 
manufactured in Montana from basic materials and that can be manufactured without the inclusion of 
any significant parts imported from another state. Generic and insignificant parts that have other 
manufacturing or consumer product applications are not firearms, firearms accessories, or ammunition, 
and their importation into Montana and incorporation into a firearm, a firearm accessory, or 
ammunition manufactured in Montana does not subject the firearm, firearm accessory, or ammunition 
to federal regulation. It is declared by the legislature that basic materials, such as unmachined steel and 
unshaped wood, are not firearms, firearms accessories, or ammunition and are not subject to 
congressional authority to regulate firearms, firearms accessories, and ammunition under interstate 
commerce as if they were actually firearms, firearms accessories, or ammunition. The authority of 
congress to regulate interstate commerce in basic materials does not include authority to regulate 
firearms, firearms accessories, and ammunition made in Montana from those materials.”). 
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due to reliance on the IFFA.80 Interestingly, the IFFA as initially proposed anticipated 
this possibility.81 It provided that moneys from the Idaho Constitutional Defense 
Fund, which is funded by taxpayer dollars, could be used to defend Idaho citizens 
in any legal matter that arose due to compliance with the IFFA.82 This provision was 
ultimately removed, not after any assurance that Idaho citizens would not be 
subject to federal prosecution, but after senators voiced their concerns over the 
potential fiscal implications.83  
Consequently, Idaho citizens will be left to fund their own defense, should 
their actions in reliance on the IFFA result in federal prosecution.84 More important 
than this potential fiscal implication is the simple fact that citizens who rely on the 
IFFA may be unknowingly risking the possibility of federal criminal prosecution and 
incarceration.85 As of February 25, 2019, the IFFA remains codified law in Idaho, 
leaving open the potential for detrimental reliance by Idaho citizens who are 
unaware of its invalidity.86 
At a broader level, the potential for detrimental reliance on firearms freedom 
legislation has been recognized since its origination in Montana. The Montana 
Shooting Sports Association, the organization that joined Gary Marbut in his suit 
seeking to validate the MFFA, urged citizens not to rely on the law while the case 
was still pending.87 The Association immediately recognized the potential for 
citizens who relied on the law to be subject to federal prosecution.88 
It is useful to note that although Idaho has no public record of detrimental 
reliance on the IFFA, the federal government may still have encountered Idaho 
citizens who incorrectly believed they were legally possessing firearms based on the 
IFFA.89 Moreover, the federal government has prosecuted individuals from other 
 
80. Senate State Affairs Committee: Hearing on H.B. 589, 2010 Leg. (Idaho 2010), 
https://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2010/standingcommittees/SSTA/. 
81. Idaho Code § 67-6301 (2019). 
82. Id. 
83. Id.; Senate State Affairs Committee: Hearing on H.B. 589, supra note 80; S. Amendment to 
H.B. No. 589, 2010 Leg., https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sessioninfo/2010/legislation/H0589A2.pdf. This amendment struck the provision that 
provided for the use of Idaho Constitutional Defense Fund moneys. Id.  
84. S. Amendment to H.B. No. 589, supra note 83.  
85. 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (2019); 26 U.S.C. § 5871 (2019) (possessing a firearm in violation of federal 
law is punishable by up to ten years in federal prison).  
86. Idaho Code § 18-3315A (2019). 
87. Gun Groups File Lawsuit to Validate Montana Firearms Freedom Act, FIREARMS FREEDOM ACT 
(Oct. 1, 2009), http://firearmsfreedomact.com/2009/10/01/gun-groups-file-lawsuit-to-validate-
montana-firearms-freedom-act/.  
88. Id.  
89. Although there have been no federal prosecutions of Idahoans who detrimentally believed 
that the IFFA exempted them from federal regulation and thereby federal prosecution, it is certainly 
possible that federal agents have encountered such individuals. It is within the government’s discretion 
to choose not to prosecute these individuals but rather inform them that they are violating federal law 
and encourage them to rethink their actions.  





states who, due to their state’s firearms freedom legislation, believed they were 
acting lawfully when in fact they were violating federal law.90  
For example, Kansas, a state whose firearms freedom legislation closely 
parallels both the IFFA and MFFA, has seen two state citizens prosecuted due to 
their reliance on a state law that led them to believe they were exempt from federal 
firearms laws.91 In 2014 Shane Cox, a Kansas citizen, began manufacturing and 
selling silencers without registering them with the federal government—a 
requirement under federal law.92 With each silencer sold, he handed out copies of 
the Second Amendment Protection Act, Kansas’s firearms freedom legislation.93 In 
2016 Cox was found guilty for the manufacture, sale, and possession of 
unregistered firearms and silencers, a crime under the National Firearms Act.94 Cox 
was sentenced to two years’ probation.95 
One of Cox’s customers, Jeremy Kettler, also a Kansas citizen, was thrilled with 
the silencer he purchased from Cox, so much so that he posted a video about it on 
Facebook.96 In 2016 Kettler was found guilty for possessing an unregistered 
silencer.97 At trial, Kettler told the jury that he bought the silencer “because of a 
piece of paper signed by the governor saying it was legal.”98 Kettler also criticized 
Kansas, saying the state had set up its “‘citizens to be prosecuted’ by the federal 
government.”99 Kettler was sentenced to one year’s probation.100 
 
90. Associated Press, Kansas Gun Case Pits Federal Law Against States’ Rights, DENVER POST (Nov. 
22, 2016, 7:40 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2016/11/21/kansas-gun-case-pits-federal-law-
against-states-rights/.  
91. Roxana Hegeman, Kansas Man’s Homemade Gun Silencers Clash With Federal Law, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, (Nov. 22, 2016, 5:42 PM), https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-
world/national/article116514673.html; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-1204(a)–(b) (West 2019) (“A personal 
firearm, a firearm accessory or ammunition that is manufactured commercially or privately and owned 
in Kansas and that remains within the borders of Kansas is not subject to any federal law, treaty, federal 
regulation, or federal executive action, including any federal firearm or ammunition registration 
program, under the authority of congress to regulate interstate commerce. It is declared by the 
legislature that those items have not traveled in interstate commerce. This section applies to a firearm, 
a firearm accessory or ammunition that is manufactured commercially or privately and owned in the 
state of Kansas. Component parts are not firearms, firearms accessories or ammunition, and their 
importation into Kansas and incorporation into a firearm, a firearm accessory or ammunition 
manufactured and owned in Kansas does not subject the firearm, firearm accessory or ammunition to 
federal regulation. It is declared by the legislature that such component parts are not firearms, firearms 
accessories or ammunition and are not subject to congressional authority to regulate firearms, firearms 
accessories and ammunition under interstate commerce as if they were actually firearms, firearms 
accessories or ammunition.”).  
92. Hegeman, supra note 91.  
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. United States v. Cox, 906 F.3d 1170, 1178 (10th Cir. 2018). 




100. Cox, 906 F.3d at 1178.  
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Kettler’s criticism of Kansas is not without merit, as the state knew its 
legislation was unconstitutional immediately after it took effect, if not before.101 
Following the passage of Kansas’s Second Amendment Protection Act, then-U.S. 
Attorney General Eric Holder sent a letter advising the Governor of Kansas that the 
legislation was unconstitutional.102 The letter pointed out that Kansas’s firearms 
freedom legislation directly conflicted with multiple federal firearms laws.103 It also 
alerted the Governor that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 
along with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, and the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Kansas, 
would continue to enforce all federal firearms laws.104 Despite this notice from 
Attorney General, the Second Amendment Protection Act remained codified law in 
Kansas.105  
Cox and Kettler jointly appealed their convictions to the Tenth Circuit.106 In 
their appeal, neither Cox nor Kettler denied that they violated the National Firearms 
Act.107 Instead, they argued that the National Firearms Act, at least as applied to 
their conduct, was unconstitutional.108 The pair first challenged the 
constitutionality of the NFA by arguing that it was not a valid exercise of Congress’s 
taxing power.109 Cox and Kettler also argued that the NFA violated the Second 
Amendment.110 Both challenges to the NFA were rejected by the court.111  
Notably, Cox and Kettler also claimed that their reliance on Kansas’s Second 
Amendment Protection Act should have been a defense to their violation of federal 
firearms laws.112 The Tenth Circuit declined to allow for a mistake-of-law defense 
for either defendant.113 In declining to allow a mistake-of-law defense, the court 
noted that both Cox and Kettler had already received a benefit from their reliance 
on the Second Amendment Protection Act, as it was taken into account during their 
sentencing.114  
 
101. Letter from Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., to Sam Brownback, Governor of Kan. (Apr. 26, 2013), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/695506-attorney-general-holder-letter-to-kans-gov. 
102. Id.  
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-1204(a)–(b) (West 2019). 
106. United States v. Cox, 906 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 2018).  
107. Id. at 1178. 
108. Id. at 1178–79. 
109. Id. at 1179. 
110. Id. at 1183. 
111. Id. at 1183, 1188. 
112. Cox, 906 F.3d at 1189. 
113. Id. at 1190. 
114. Id. at 1195. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Cox, 906 F.3d 1170 (No. 18-936) 
(procedural history involves joint defendants, Petition also found under Kettler v. United States, No. 18-
936, 2019 U.S. WL 277233 (Jan. 16, 2019)); Brief for Kansas, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Cox, 906 F.3d 1170 (No.18-936) (procedural history involves joint appellants, Petition also found under, 
 





It is unknown whether Idaho legislators are aware of these somewhat recent 
prosecutions in Kansas or the defendants’ unsuccessful appeal. And although no 
Idaho citizens have been prosecuted for similar crimes, the possibility of 
prosecution presumably persists so long as the IFFA remains codified law in Idaho. 
Based on the Tenth Circuit’s holding, as well as general principles surrounding the 
availability of a mistake-of-law-defense, Idahoans who detrimentally rely on the 
IFFA will likely have no reliance-based defense, should they be subject to federal 
prosecution.115  
This is only one of many potential negative repercussions generated by the 
IFFA. As mentioned above, the mistaken belief that firearms made in Idaho are not 
subject to federal regulation could result in individuals who are otherwise 
prohibited from possessing firearms gaining possession of a firearm that is made in 
Idaho.116  
E. Other Counteractive Legislation in Idaho 
The Idaho Firearms Freedom Act is not the only legislation passed or proposed 
by Idaho legislators that challenges federal law.117  
In 2014, Idaho legislators successfully passed another piece of counteractive 
legislation pertaining to the regulation of firearms.118  Unlike the IFFA, the 2014 law, 
titled the “Idaho Federal Firearm, Magazine and Register Ban Enforcement Act” 
 
Kettler v. United States, No. 18-936, 2019 U.S. WL 932011 (Feb. 19, 2019)). Idaho joined an amicus brief 
filed by the state of Kansas in support of Mr. Kettler. Id. at 1. In it, amici argue that any regulations of 
firearms accessories, such as silencers, invoke Second Amendment protection and therefore must be 
subject to Second Amendment scrutiny. Id. at 4. Amici do not attempt to defend the Kansas Firearms 
Freedom Act, nor do they argue that states have the right to enact laws like it that attempt to nullify 
federal law. Id. at 2–3.  
115. See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text; see also Mary D. Fan, Legalization Conflicts 
and Reliance Defenses, 92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 907, 949 (2015) (noting that reliance on firearms nullification 
laws is unreasonable and does not provide a mistake-of-law defense because of the longstanding federal 
regulations which impose clear obligations and give citizens no reason to think sanctions will be not 
forthcoming).   
116. For example, under federal law, anyone convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence is prohibited from possessing a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2019). However, it is not difficult 
to imagine a scenario where an individual convicted of such an offense gains possession of a firearm 
stamped “made in Idaho,” either because they believe the IFFA exempts the firearm from federal 
jurisdiction, or because they know they will not be subjected to a background check that might reveal 
their disqualification. This possibility is especially troubling given the increase in gun related deaths 
perpetrated by domestic abusers. See Tommy Simmons, Domestic Violence Deaths Are on the Rise in 
Idaho-Especially Murder-Suicides, IDAHO PRESS (July 9, 2018), 
https://www.idahopress.com/meridian/news/domestic-violence-deaths-are-on-the-rise-in-idaho-
/article_a1ad2a97-1282-561d-b2dc-272c7edb61c0.html.  
117. Idaho Code § 39-9003 (2019). 
118. Emma Roller, Idaho Has Declared It Won’t Obey New Federal Gun Laws, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 
25, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/03/idaho-has-declared-it-wont-obey-
new-federal-gun-laws/455652/; Debbie Bryce, Nullifying Federal Gun Laws in Idaho: Gov. Butch Otter 
Signs Senate Bill 1332 Into Law, IDAHO ST. J. (Mar. 25, 2014), 
https://www.idahostatejournal.com/members/nullifying-federal-gun-laws-in-idaho-gov-butch-otter-
signs/article_97429e26-b3f0-11e3-8581-001a4bcf887a.html.  
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(The Act), does not purport to nullify any federal regulations.119 Instead, the law 
seeks to prevent Idaho law enforcement officers from assisting federal agents in 
the confiscation of illegal firearms or ammunition.120  
The Act was enacted to “protect Idaho law enforcement officers from being 
directed, through federal executive orders, agency orders, statutes, laws, rules, or 
regulations . . . .”121 The Act created a civil penalty for any state employee who 
enforces any unconstitutional federal regulation related to firearms, firearm 
accessories, or ammunition.122 Notably, “unconstitutional” in the context of the Act, 
refers to federal regulations that violate the Idaho Constitution.123  
Interestingly, the Act did not identify which federal regulations were 
unconstitutional.124 Instead, at least according to the Act’s sponsor, Senator Steve 
Vick, it is up to each state law enforcement officer or employee to individually 
determine which laws violate the Idaho Constitution.125 Idaho was one of several 
states to pass counteractive legislation that attempts to limit the ability of state 
agents to enforce federal firearm regulations.126 
In 2018, legislators attempted to pass a law that purported to give Idaho the 
power to nullify all federal laws.127 HB-461 declared that Idaho lawmakers have the 
power to void federal laws and court decisions.128 Despite an opinion from the 
Idaho Attorney General’s Office stating that the law was unconstitutional, 
legislators moved forward with an attempt to pass the law.129 While some 
 
119. Idaho Code § 18-3315B (2019). 
120. Id.  
121. See S.B. 1332, 62nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2014). 
122. Idaho Code § 18-3315B (2019).  
123. Id. 
124. Id.  
125. Relating to Firearms to Protect Idaho Law Enforcement Officers from Being Directed Through 
Federal Orders to Violate Their Oath of Office or Idaho Citizens’ Rights Under the Idaho Constitution: 
Hearing on S. 1332 Before the S. State Affairs Comm., 2014 Leg. 4 (Idaho 2014) (statement of Sen. Steve 
Vick), https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sessioninfo/2014/standingcommittees/SSTAmin.pdf.  
126. Roller, supra note 118.  
127. Betsy Z. Russell, Idaho Lawmakers Advance Federal Nullification Bill, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Feb. 
14, 2018, 10:21 AM), http://www.spokesman.com/blogs/boise/2018/feb/14/idaho-lawmakers-
advance-federal-nullification-bill/; H.R. 461, 64th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2018), 
https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sessioninfo/2018/legislation/H0461.pdf. 
128. H.R. 461, 64th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2018), https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sessioninfo/2018/legislation/H0461.pdf (“The Idaho Legislature hereby declares that 
the state of Idaho, on behalf of its citizens, is the final arbiter of whether an act of Congress, a federal 
regulation or a court decision is unconstitutional and may declare that the federal laws, regulations or 
court decisions are not authorized by the Constitution of the United States and violate its meaning and 
intent, and further, are null, void and of no effect regarding any Idaho citizen residing within the borders 
of the state of Idaho.”). 
129. Letter from Lawrence G. Wasden, Att’y Gen., State of Idaho, to Paul E. Shepherd, 
Representative, State of Idaho (Jan. 27, 2017), https://media.spokesman.com/documents/2018/02/AG-
opinion-nullification-bill.pdf; Russell, supra note 127.  





supporters of the law acknowledged its ineffectiveness, others appear to have 
believed that the state of Idaho possessed the power to nullify federal law or 
declare it to be unconstitutional.130  
 In 2018, Idaho joined other states in taking a stand against the Affordable 
Care Act.131 Rather than simply declaring the ACA null and void as many other states 
had done, Idaho took a different approach. Idaho declared that it would allow the 
sales of insurance plans that did not comply with the requirements of the ACA.132 
 Most recently, on Tuesday, January 22, 2019, Idaho legislators released the 
draft of a proposed law that would treat abortion as murder.133 The proposed Idaho 
Abortion Human Rights Act (IAHRA), introduced by two republican representatives, 
would repeal the current state law that exempts women and those who perform 
abortions or assist in performing abortions from being charged with murder.134 
Representative Heather Scott, one of the two Idaho legislators who introduced the 
IAHRA, cited prior counteractive legislation in Idaho as justification for the IAHRA.135 
The intent of the law is to “nullify [Roe v. Wade] by exercising the state's 
legitimate interest in enforcing its own murder laws and protecting all Idahoans, 
including the preborn.”136 The IAHRA would make abortion at any period, even in 
the first trimester, a criminal offense chargeable as murder.137 It makes no 
exceptions for circumstances involving rape, incest, an unviable fetus, or threat to 
the life of the mother.138   
 The IAHRA states that Idaho law enforcement officers, prosecutors, the 
Idaho Legislature, the executive branch, and Idaho’s judicial branch are each 
violating their oath of office as well as the rights of Idaho citizens by allowing 
 
130. Betsy Z. Russell, Idaho House Panel Backs Bill to Declare That State Lawmakers Can Overturn 
Federal Laws, Court Decisions, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Feb. 14, 2018, 10:07 PM), 
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2018/feb/14/idaho-house-panel-backs-bill-to-declare-that-state/. 
Representative Christy Zito acknowledged that the state did not have the power to overrule a decision 
made by the federal government but chose to support the bill because she believed it was a powerful 
means of speaking out against a decision made by the federal government that she disagreed with. Id. 
In contrast, Representative Paul Shepard, the bill’s primary sponsor, said that he believed that each state 
has the power to declare a federal law unconstitutional, thereby making it “void” and unenforceable in 
that state. Id.  
131. See infra note 172.  
132. Dylan Scott, Idaho’s Brazen Plan to Unravel Obamacare, Explained, VOX (Feb. 21, 2018, 8:30 
AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/2/21/17029822/obamacare-trump-idaho. 
133. Mike Price, Idaho Legislators Seek to Make Abortion Murder, EAST IDAHO NEWS.COM (Jan. 30, 
2019, 6:00 PM), https://www.eastidahonews.com/2019/01/idaho-legislators-seek-to-make-abortion-
murder/. 
134. Id.; Idaho Code § 18-4016 (2019). 
135. Heather Scott, Guns & Babies! Part 1, (Jan. 24, 2019, 4:20 PM), 
https://www.facebook.com/RepHeatherScott/videos/1084729788376554/. (Representative Scott cited 
the Idaho Federal Firearm, Magazine and Register Ban Enforcement Act, questioning why Idaho 
legislators would “stand up for firearms but not for a human life.”).  
136. Heather Scott, Idaho Abortion Human Rights Act (AHRA) Frequently Asked Questions: What 
About Roe v. Wade and Other Federal Court Cases?, REP. HEATHER SCOTT, 
https://repheatherscott.com/abortion/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2020).  
137. Heather Scott, Idaho Abortion Human Rights Act Final Draft (Aug. 2019), 
https://repheatherscott.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/RCB019FINAL-AHRA.pdf. 
138. Id.  
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abortions.139 However, the oath of office taken by all Idaho legislators involves a 
pledge to uphold the United States Constitution, which guarantees the right to an 
abortion, at least until a certain point during pregnancy.140 
The explicit goal of the legislation is to end abortion in Idaho.141 This is in direct 
contradiction with the constitutionally protected right to an abortion.142 If the 
IAHRA is passed, legislators will be unable to uphold both state and federal law.  
The legislators backing the IAHRA seem to be aware of the conflict between 
the proposed law and federal law protecting abortions.143 These same legislators 
also appear to be operating under the mistaken belief that states have the power 
to nullify federal law.144 
IV. COUNTERACTIVE LEGISLATION ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
Idaho is neither the first nor the only state to enact some form of 
counteractive legislation.145 At the national level, the phenomenon of counteractive 
legislation has been alive and well for over 200 years.146 Upticks in counteractive 
legislation have occurred in response to various policy shifts, but the underlying 
motivator in most, if not all attempts at passing counteractive legislation, appears 
to be the perception of government overreach.147  
Counteractive legislation was first introduced in 1798, in response to the 
passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts.148 The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions 
(the Resolutions), authored by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison respectively, 
 
139. Id. Idaho Code § 59-401 (2019). All members of the Idaho legislature take an oath of office 
in which they proclaim their support of the Idaho Constitution. § 59-401. When taking the oath, they 
also pledge their support for the US Constitution. Id. 
140. Idaho Code § 59-401 (2019); Nathan Brown, Lawmakers Propose Bill to Nullify Roe v. Wade, 
IDAHO ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.idahostatejournal.com/news/local/lawmakers-propose-bill-to-
nullify-roe-wv-wade/article_0be13c9d-25d9-52d8-a09c-42985e91ff60.html; see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 113 (1973), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
141. Scott, supra note 137.  
142. Id.  
143. James Dawson, Idaho Lawmakers Drafting Bill to Ban Abortions, BOISE ST. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 23, 
2019), https://www.boisestatepublicradio.org/post/idaho-lawmakers-drafting-bill-ban-
abortions#stream/0.  
144. Id. (Representatives Scott and Green stated that “Idaho is a sovereign state and ‘has the 
fundamental duty and right to act as a check-and-balance to the federal government any time it errs on 
constitutional issues.’”); Idaho Code § 59-401 (2019); Brown, supra note 14040. Representative Scott 
and Green believe the U.S. Supreme Court precedents legalizing abortion are themselves 
unconstitutional, and therefore the state shouldn’t abide by them. Dawson, supra note 1433.  
145. See John Dinan, Contemporary Assertions of State Sovereignty and the Safeguards of 
American Federalism, 74 Alb. L. Rev. 1637, 1638 (2011). 
146. Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, BILL RTS. INST., https://billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-
documents/primary-source-documents/virginia-and-kentucky-resolutions/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2019). 
147. Dinan, supra note 145.  
148. Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, supra note 146.  





argued that the federal government exceeds its constitutional parameters anytime 
it exercises power not expressly given to it in the Constitution.149 The Kentucky 
Resolution was the first of its kind to assert that states had the power to nullify 
federal laws they deemed unconstitutional.150  
Both Jefferson’s and Madison’s propositions were rooted in the idea that 
states together had the power to challenge federal law.151 While neither resolution 
was a direct attempt at nullifying a specific federal law, they were the first 
formalized decrees against the federal government’s exercise of its power.152 The 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions laid the groundwork for numerous pieces of 
counteractive legislation proposed and passed over the next 200 years.153  
In 1798, Marbury v. Madison had not been decided, meaning that at that time 
the states were unable to rely on legal precedent permitting them to challenge 
federal laws in court.154 The Resolutions were perhaps the only meaningful forum 
to challenge contested government action. However, when Marbury was decided 
in 1803, the Supreme Court established the doctrine of judicial review, clarifying 
that the federal judiciary has the duty of resolving challenges to federal law that are 
believed to be unconstitutional.155 
Despite the Court’s establishment of judicial review, states have continued to 
enact counteractive legislation rather than using the courts to challenge 
legislation.156 In fact, less than 30 years after the opinion in Marbury was 
announced, states continued on the path laid by the Resolutions, enacting 
counteractive legislation in lieu of bringing direct challenges in federal court.157  
In 1832, likely inspired by the Resolutions, John Calhoun mounted his own 
attack against the federal government, asserting the right of South Carolina to avoid 
federally imposed tariffs.158 Similar to the position argued in the Resolutions, 
Calhoun asserted that states had the ability to declare a federal law null and void.159 
However, distinct from Jefferson’s and Madison’s views, Calhoun argued that the 
 
149. Id. 
150. Id. (“[T]he several states who formed that instrument, being sovereign and independent, 
have the unquestionable right to judge of its infraction; and that a nullification, by those sovereignties, 
of all unauthorized acts done under colour of that instrument, is the rightful remedy . . .”). 
151. Id.  
152. Id. 
153. Nullification Crisis, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/nullification-
crisis last visited Oct. 9, 2019). 
154. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the doctrine of judicial review, 
which established that the federal courts are the proper forum for resolving laws believed to be 
unconstitutional). 
155. Id. at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is.”). 
156. See Dinan, supra note 145.  
157. Nullification Crisis, supra note 153.  
158. Id.   
159. The South Carolina Nullification Controversy, USHISTORY.ORG, 
http://www.ushistory.org/us/24c.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2019); Albert L. Samuels, All But Overturned: 
America’s Nullification of Brown v. Board of Education, SSRN (Nov. 6, 2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2350799##. Calhoun was a long-time defender 
of state’s rights. Id. 
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states individually had the power to nullify federal law.160 Calhoun packed a 
seemingly harder punch than Jefferson and Madison; he threatened South 
Carolina’s secession from the Union if the federal government acted to enforce the 
tariffs.161 South Carolina accepted Calhoun’s proposition and adopted the 
“Ordinances of Nullification.”162  
Responding to the Ordinances of Nullification and South Carolina’s threat of 
secession, President Andrew Jackson issued a proclamation against South Carolina 
and any attempts at nullification or secession.163 The proclamation declared that 
states do not have the power to nullify federal law, and that no state possessed the 
right to secede from the Union.164 Following President Jackson’s proclamation, as if 
to further affirm the Union’s stance against the idea of state nullification, Congress 
passed the Force Act, which authorized the use of military force against states that 
resisted the federal tariff.165 After South Carolina’s attempt at nullification and its 
ultimate secession, there was not another attempt at pure nullification by a state 
for over one hundred years.166  
Following the Supreme Court’s 1954 decisions in Brown v. Board of Education 
and Bolling v. Sharpe, many states adopted counteractive legislation that conflicted 
with the Court’s decisions regarding segregation in schools.167 The states that 
 
160. See The South Carolina Nullification Controversy, supra note 159; Samuels, supra note 159; 
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(Dec. 17, 2012, 3:17 PM), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/865568961/This-week-in-history-
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161. Carlson, supra note 160.  
162. Id.; see Mike Maharrey, Understanding Madison’s Notes on Nullification, TENTH AMEND. CTR. 
(Jan. 21, 2014), https://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2014/01/21/understanding-madisons-notes-on-
nullification/. Despite Calhoun’s reliance on Jefferson’s and Madison’s Resolutions, Madison ultimately 
condemned South Carolina’s attempt at nullification. Id.  
163. Andrew Jackson, A Proclamation Respecting the Nullifying Laws of South Carolina, 
Proclamation No. 43, 11 Stat. 771 (Dec. 10, 1832). 
164. Id.; see The Secession of South Carolina, U.S. House Representatives: Hist., Arts & Archives, 
https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1851-1900/The-secession-of-South-Carolina/ (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2019). Despite President Jackson’s proclamation declaring the absence of a right to 
secession, South Carolina ultimately achieved its goal of seceding from the Union in December of 1860. 
Id.  
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https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/nullification.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).  
166. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding that states do not have the power to nullify 
federal law). 
167. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. 
Board of Education Timeline, NAT’L ARCHIVES, (last updated Aug. 15, 2016), 
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opposed the Court’s rulings claimed they had authority to invalidate Brown, viewing 
it as an illegal intrusion on states’ rights.168  
Unsurprisingly, this attempt to bypass federal law was quickly rejected by the 
Court in Cooper v. Aaron.169 The Court’s condemnation of the attempted 
nullification was express: “[i]f the legislatures of the several states may, at will, 
annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights 
acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn 
mockery.”170  
 This decision likely did not come as a shock to most of the states who adopted 
the counteractive legislation. Similar to the Idaho legislators who passed the IFFA, 
many of the legislators who supported the Southern nullification laws were made 
aware of the laws’ inevitable ineffectiveness long before the Court announced its 
decision in Cooper.171  
After the Court’s rejection of nullification in Cooper, there was a relative lull 
in counteractive legislation. The next uptick happened in response to federal health 
care reform. Almost immediately after the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was passed in 
2010, a large number of states introduced legislation in opposition to various 
portions of the ACA.172 The ACA included an individual mandate which required all 
individuals living in the United State to purchase health insurance.173 Between 2010 
and 2011, fifteen states adopted statutes or constitutional amendments that aimed 
to limit the effectiveness of the individual mandate.174 Some state legislatures went 
as far as asserting their sovereign powers and explicitly challenging the federal 
government’s individual mandate.175 
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170. Id. at 18 (quoting United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. 115, 136 (1809)). 
171. Ryan Card, Note & Comment, Can States "Just Say No" to Federal Health Care Reform? The 
Constitutional and Political Implications of State Attempts to Nullify Federal Law, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 1795, 
1812–13 (political leaders including attorneys general, law professors, and school superintendents 
recognized the futility in nullification legislation). 
172.  Richard Cauchi, Archive Report: 2009 – 2010 State Legislation and Actions Challenging 
Certain Health Reforms, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 1, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-legislation-challenging-ppaca-2009-10.aspx. 
173. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 5000A, 124 Stat. 119, 244 
(2010). 
174. Richard Cauchi, State Laws and Actions Challenging Certain Health Reforms, NAT'L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-laws-and-actions-challenging-
ppaca.aspx.  
175. See Idaho Code § 39-9003 (2019) (“The power to require or regulate a person's choice in the 
mode of securing health care services, or to impose a penalty related thereto, is not found in the 
Constitution of the United States of America, and is therefore a power reserved to the people pursuant 
to the Ninth Amendment, and to the several states pursuant to the Tenth Amendment. The state 
 
2020 FEDERALISM OF THE HIGHEST CALIBER: 
COUNTERACTIVE LEGISLATION AND THE IDAHO 







At the same time, many states were beginning to pass their versions of 
firearms freedom acts. The Montana Firearms Freedom Act, the first of its kind, was 
passed in 2009.176 As previously discussed, Idaho and many other states followed 
suit in 2010.177 The surge in firearms freedom legislation does not appear to have 
been prompted by any specific change in national policy. As examined above, this 
attempt at challenging the federal government was rather unsuccessful.  
Perhaps the most recent example of counteractive legislation is the state 
legalization of recreational or medicinal marijuana usage by many states across the 
country.178 Although most state laws that allow the use of marijuana do not actually 
purport to nullify federal law, these laws likely represent the most well-known 
examples of state legislation that is in direct contradiction with federal law. 
Interestingly, the majority of states that allow marijuana usage aim to make their 
citizens well aware of the potential for federal prosecution, regardless of the state 
laws.179 The majority of states that enacted legislation allowing for medicinal and 
recreational usage of marijuana did so with the knowledge that the federal 
government was unlikely to prosecute individuals for using small amounts of 
marijuana.180  
V. MOVING FORWARD 
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In Idaho specifically, the convictions of Mr. Cox and Mr. Kettler in Kansas 
support the need for action by either the legislature or Idaho citizens in response 
to the IFFA. So long as the IFFA remains codified, there is the potential for 
detrimental reliance by Idahoans that could ultimately result in federal convictions. 
There are a variety of ways Idaho could choose to handle the IFFA, the most 
straightforward being to repeal the law. On its face, the process of repealing a law 
is not a simple one. In order for the legislature to repeal the IFFA itself, a bill would 
need to be introduced by a member of either the House or the Senate. 
It seems unlikely that any legislator would feel confident in proposing a bill to 
remove the IFFA, which is seen by many as protection against an increasing cry for 
gun control.181 Internal repeal would be made more difficult due to the fact that 
many of IFFA’s original supporters remain in the Idaho Legislature.182 Furthermore, 
Idaho Legislators have historically been hesitant to repeal unconstitutional laws, 
even after being directed to do so by a federal judge.183 
The law could also be repealed by a ballot initiative.184 An initiative to abolish 
the IFFA may be just as, if not more, difficult than attempting to persuade the 
legislature to repeal the law themselves.185 The process of getting an initiative on 
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the ballot in Idaho is a lengthy one and is only the first step in getting a law repealed. 
Even if an initiative to repeal the IFFA made its way onto the ballot, the likelihood 
that electors would vote in favor of a proposal seems unlikely.  
Considering that the IFFA remains codified law in Idaho, it is a fair assumption 
that the majority of Idahoans, and perhaps the majority of Idaho Legislators, are 
unaware of the law’s unconstitutionality. Simply stating that the law is 
unconstitutional would likely not be enough to persuade Idahoans that the law is 
worth repealing. Without a detailed explanation of the IFFA’s problems as well as 
its potential repercussions on Idahoans, it seems unlikely that a strong Second 
Amendment state would vote to remove a law that purports to strengthen gun 
rights.  
Given the various hurdles in repealing the IFFA, perhaps Idaho’s best course 
of action is to follow the approach used by the Montana Shooting Sports 
Association in relation to the MFFA. As discussed above, the Montana Shooting 
Sports Association warned citizens not to rely on the MFFA until the lawsuit was 
resolved.186 Following the Ninth Circuit’s finding that the law was invalid, the 
Association continued to warn citizens that reliance on the law could result in 
federal prosecution.187  
Be it the legislature or a private entity, someone could take up the cause of 
simply warning Idaho citizens of the potential consequences of relying on the IFFA. 
Doing so could change the way Idaho citizens view the IFFA and might ultimately 
motivate them to encourage their legislators to repeal the law and refrain from 
passing similar laws in the future. 
At the national level, increasing awareness of counteractive legislation and its 
implications may be the best approach to confronting problems created by such 
legislation. Moving forward, legislators throughout the country should be hesitant 
to enact or even propose counteractive legislation. From the author’s perspective, 
the obvious dangers that counteractive legislation poses to citizens often outweigh 
its potential benefits. Moreover, time spent on drafting, proposing, assessing, and, 
passing counteractive legislation could be dedicated to laws that bring about 
meaningful and effective change in the state.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The phenomenon of counteractive legislation began not long after the 
founding of the United States. A close look at the Idaho Firearms Freedom Act 
provides a useful survey of a single piece of counteractive legislation from proposal 
to codification. Based on the historical existence of counteractive legislation and its 
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continued use today, it is unlikely that this phenomenon will cease to exist anytime 
in the near future. While counteractive legislation can provide a forum for codifying 
a state’s displeasure with distinct federal action, it comes at a high cost. Legislators 
should proceed with caution if they encounter proposed counteractive legislation 
in the future, and perhaps should consider repealing existing legislation of its kind.  
